Scientific discovery is a complex process that can involve an experimental or theoretical paradigm shift as well as the development of concepts and explanations that make sense of previously unknown facts. A crucial element of scientific discovery is the binding together, or “colligating” (as Whewell puts it) of existing facts and showing them in a new light. This can be done through a variety of means, including experimenting with models, clarifying ideas, and making explicit the definitions and axioms that are tacitly implied in them.
In the past, philosophical reflection on scientific discovery focused on these different aspects of the knowledge-generating process. However, as empirical research in sciences like history of science, sociology of science, and cognitive psychology have become increasingly influential, the conceptualization of discovery has been re-examined and re-structured.
Today, there is broad agreement that scientific discovery is not a straightforward eureka moment. It includes processes of articulating, developing, and testing the novel insight as well as the community’s adjudication of what does and does not count as a discovery. In addition, many philosophers have emphasized that discovery is not simply inferential but can also be achieved through heuristic and non-inferential ways.
However, some philosophers argue that this is not enough to account for how discoveries are made. They offer meta-philosophical objection arguments that claim that since discovery is an irrational and intuitive process, the notion of discovery cannot be examined logically. Alternatively, they argue that the inferential and heuristic processes of discovery are not a matter for philosophy, but rather are a social or psychological phenomenon.